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California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual parenthood.1
Court may find…more than two persons with a claim to parentage…if…recognizing only two
parents would be detrimental to the child.2
*
Emeritus Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby College; J.D., The University of
Chicago. An early draft of this paper was presented at the Sixth Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium on
November 7, 2015 at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The paper has benefitted greatly from the reviews
by Professors Marc D. Falkoff, Daniel S. McConkie, Jr., Heidi Frostestad Kuehl, and Laurel A. Rigertas. As well,
Danny Mark, Matt Cole, Randall Roelfsema, and David A. Saxe provided excellent research assistance. All errors
are mine.

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S 110, 118 (1989)(J. Scalia, joined by The Chief Justice, J. O’Connor and J.
Kennedy) [hereinafter Michael H.]. Compare id. at 162 (J. White, joined by J. Brennan, dissenting)(“it is hardly rare
in this world of divorce and remarriage for a child to live with the father to whom her mother is married, and still
have a relationship with her biological father.”)

1

Cal. Fam. Code 7612(c) (effective in 2013). See also Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, 1853 (effective July 2016) (“a court
may determine that a child has more than 2 parents”). Precedents have also permitted three childcare parents in the
absence of statute. See, e.g., In re M.W., 292 P.3d 1158 (Col. App. 2012) (psychological parent shares custody with
two biological parents); Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A-2d 473 (Pa. Super. 2007) (custody shared between birth

2

1
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I.

Introduction

In context, the first quote, from a U.S. Supreme Court opinion, concluded there could be
no dual paternity in California for federal constitutional childcare purposes. Such childcare
encompasses the principle that parents, as defined by state law, have superior rights, under the
federal constitution, to the “care, custody and control” of their children.3 The second quote,
from a more recent California statute, recognizes there can be dual or triple paternity or
maternity, though nature alone usually does not allow a second biological father or mother.4
Thus, this quote suggests that “nature itself” need not always accompany a finding of legal
parentage outside of formal adoption. It allows function to supplement (or trump) actual or

mother, her same sex partner and the sperm donor who served as a parent in an AHR birth); and T.E.B. v. C.A.B.,
74 A.3d 170, 177-8 (Pa. Super. 2013) (shared custody to biological father, presumptive father (i.e., husband) and
birth mother).
3
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) [hereinafter Troxel]. See also id. At 77 (J. Souter,
concurring) (“We have long recognized that a parent’s interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care and
custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”), id. At 87 (J.
Stevens, dissenting) (“Our cases leave no doubt that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for and
guiding their children”); and id. at 95 (J. Kennedy, dissenting) (“there is a beginning point that commands general,
perhaps unanimous, agreements in our separate opinions: As our case law has developed, the custodial parent has a
constitutional right to determined, without undue interference by the state, how best to raise nurture and educate the
child. The parental right stems from the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).

With unnatural help, in limited settings there can be dual paternity or maternity. See, e.g., Charles P. Kindregan, Jr.
and Maureen McBrien, Assisted Reproductive Technology, at 42 (American Bar Association, Section of Family
Law, 2011) [hereinafter Kindregan and McBrien] (describing “blended intrauterine insemination process,” with a
few cases) and Yehezkel Margalit, Orrie Levy, and John Loike, “The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive
Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Personhood,” 37 Harvard J. of Law & Gender 107, 131 (2014) (describing
technologies allowing a child to be born with “the genetic material of three men and three women”). As the statute
references “persons” with parentage claims, it also embodies the possibility of triple maternity, triple paternity, or
three parents who each are unaligned with a particular gender. Here too nature alone does not by itself prompt
parentage under law. Consider, e.g., mitochondrial replacement therapy [involving nuclear DNA from an original
egg and mitochondrial DNA from a donor egg] to prompt a childbirth wherein the intended parents are lesbian
couples who are not egg donors. See, e.g., Amy B. Leiser, Note, “Parentage Disputes in the Age of Mitochondrial
Replacement Therapy,” 104 Georgetown L.J. (2016).

4
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presumed biological ties (e.g., marital paternity presumptions) as an avenue to legal parentage,
as well as invites legal parentage by agreement.
Functional and contractual parents are proliferating in the United States, both in and
outside of “dual parenthood.” Today, in California and elsewhere “nature itself” now does not
foreclose the possibility of not only three parents for a child, but also of only two female
parents or only two male parents, where some or all have no biological ties to the child.
The quotes, as well, suggest that American state lawmakers control parenthood issues
for purposes of determining federal constitutional childcare. As these federal constitutional
parental childcare rights are fundamental, they cannot be easily overridden by the state
legislators or judges even if their quite achievable goal is to protect the child by serving the
child’s best interest.5 Parents defined by state law hold significantly‐protected federal
constitutional childcare rights.6 Of course, state parental childcare rights can extend, though
not limit, federal constitutional parental childcare.7

See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 (plurality opinion) (“As we have explained, the Due Process Clause does not
permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state
judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”).

5

Federal constitutional childcare rights have been read to encompass custodial interests, so that once custody of a
child has been awarded to one parent, the other parent has no federal constitutional childcare rights in visitation.
Uwadiegwu v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 91 F. Supp. 3d 391 (E.D.N.Y 2015) (noncustodial parent also has no federal
constitutional right to intimate association with his/her child where there was no termination of parental rights, i.e.,
“no wholesale relinquishment” of parent’s rights with respect to his/her child and where there was a visitation
opportunity that was not “arbitrary, shocking, or egregious,” though the noncustodial parent would need to travel
from New York to Mississippi in order to visit).

6

See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W. 2d 182 (Iowa 1999) (following dissent in Michael H. by finding putative
biological father has waivable Iowa constitutional right to challenge paternity presumption favoring husband of birth
mother where her marriage remains intact) [hereinafter Callender] and In Interest of J.W.T., 872 S.W. 3d 189, 198
(Texas 1994) (Texas constitution protects against denying all putative fathers standing to sue in paternity regarding a
child born into a marriage between others).

7
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Left unexplained is how federal constitutional rightsholders8 came to be largely defined
by state laws.9 Typically federal (often U.S. Supreme Court) precedents define federal
constitutional rightsholders,10 as well as the substantive and enforcement aspects of the federal
constitutional rights. There is general uniformity nationwide, per federal cases, among the
criminally accused,11 gun toters,12 and abortion seekers13 who possess and enforce the same

Herein the term “rightholders” is employed, though not typically used by courts or commentators. While state
courts often speak of “standing” to seek court-ordered childcare, that term is often confusing. See, e.g., Daniel
Townsend, “Who Should Define Injuries for Article III Standing?”, 66 Stanford Law Review Online 76, 77 (Dec.
16, 2015) (reviewing U.S. Supreme Court precedents requiring that a plaintiff suing to enjoin unconstitutional
governmental action “be injured in order to have standing”).

8

These laws often chiefly originate in statutes and judicial precedents. Seldom do these state parentage laws arise
via state constitutional law directives. But see, e.g., Callender, 591 N.W. 2d at 192.

9

For an excellent review of how the U.S. Supreme Court has defined federal constitutional rightsholders, especially
as to corporations, aliens and felons, see Zoë Robinson, “Constitutional Personhood,” _George Washington Law
Review _(forthcoming 2016), draft available at SSRN.com/abstract=2580271 (outlining a unified approach for
federal constitutional personhood determinations) [hereinafter Constitutional Personhood].
10

See, e.g., The right of the criminally accused to a Sixth Amendment jury trial applies to state criminal cases. See,
e.g., Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989). Yet, it is inapplicable to “petty crimes,” though there
can be exceptions under federal constitutional precedents. See, e.g., Bado v. U.S., 120 A. 3d 50, (D.C. App. 2015),
reh. en banc ordered, 125 A. 3d 1119 (D.C. App. 2015).

11

See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment right to bear arms applicable
to states) [hereinafter McDonald]; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008) (people holding the right
to bear arms “unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset”); and
Walker v. U.S., 800 F.3d 720 (5th Cr. 2015) (person possessing right to bear arms can lose it by becoming a felon
and not having federal civil rights restored, per 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20)).
12

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (states cannot place “substantial obstacles” in paths
of those seeking abortions) [hereinafter Casey] and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 471, 424 (1990) (minors have
abortion right though exercise of the right can be subject to some state regulation, including prior parental notice or,
in the alternative, obtaining a judicial bypass of this notice requirement).
13

4

federal constitutional rights.14 Thus, for example, a woman who has a right to abort does not
vary much from state to state.15
Why are the requisites for federal constitutional childcaretakers largely left to state
lawmakers? Both U.S. Supreme Court and Congressional explanations, when offered, fail to
justify the extreme deference and the resulting significant interstate variations as to who is a
parent for federal constitutional parental childcare purposes. These very broad variations in
who possesses fundamental federal constitutional rights are unique to the childcare setting,
thus causing many problems for children and for those who care for them. These problems
would be mitigated if childcaretakers, like the criminally accused, gun toters, and abortion
seekers, were more precisely defined by federal lawmakers. Greater precision should be
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court, not Congress. New precedents should address a few open
questions that would prompt more complete uniformity on who constitute federal
constitutional parental childcaretakers.16 This paper explores these questions that implicate

14
Certainly, those possessing federal constitutional rights may have those rights limited in particular contexts, as
with adults who choose to work in settings involving drug, interdiction or need to carry a firearm, National Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), or with public school children participating in extracurricular
activities, Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).

See, e.g., Casey at 899 (while all women have the right, state can regulate differently the exercises of the right by
women under the age of 18). There are different state laws regulating access to abortion by all rightsholders, which
are often criticized. See, e.g., Katherine Shaw and Alex Stein, “Abortion, Informed Consent and Regulatory
Spillover,” 91 Indiana Law Journal- (2016) (found at ssrn.com/abstract=2679373).
15

16
Recognizing “the difficulty of deciding between more gradually building a solid foundation for the recognition of
new constitutional rights and immediately addressing serious indignities and other harms,” Lawrence H. Tribe,
“Equal Dignity: Speaking its Name,” 129 Harvard Law Review Forum 16, 24 (2015), this paper posits that current
variations in American state childcare parent laws are causing “impermissible geographic variations in the meaning
of federal law.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) [hereinafter Obergefell]).

5

biological, functional and/or contractual legal parents, as well as how their resolution by the
U.S. Supreme Court would benefit childcaretakers, their children, and us all.17
II.

The Few Federal Constraints on State Parental Childcare Laws

No doubt, there are federal constitutional limits, via U.S. Supreme Court precedents, on
state parentage laws that prompt in federal constitutional parental childcare rights. And, there
are some Congressional enactments further unifying parental childcare interests across the
country. Yet sharp interstate contrasts are expanding quickly without significant interventions
by federal lawmakers. To date there has been no perceived “major damage” to “clear and
substantial” federal interests in the increasing state parental childcare variations.18 Federal
lawmakers are seemingly content (or at least silent) for now on the differing state law
definitions of parents who possess federal constitutional childcare rights. The federal
constitution itself, the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress might each constrain state parental
childcare lawmaking.
A. The Federal Constitution
Within the federal constitutional Bill of Rights there is no explicit recognition of parental
childcare interests or of Congressional authority to define such interests. For enumerated rights

Concededly, not everyone laments the current broad lawmaking authority over parental childcare now vested in
American state lawmakers. See, e.g., Samantha Godwin, “Against Parental Rights,” 47 Columbia Human Rights
Review 1, 81 (2015) (“Ending due process-based constitutional rights for parents would free up the states to
consider different parental rights regimes.”).

17

18

Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581-581 (citing Yazell, 382 U.S. at 352).

6

like speech,19 press,20 and religion,21 the constitution is silent on affirmative Congressional
authority (though it constrains that authority). For the Civil Rights Amendments on involuntary
servitude,22 equal protection,23 due process,24 and voting,25 the federal constitution provides
that Congress has the affirmative power “to enforce by appropriate legislation.”26
So whether or not Congress has any say on enforcement of federal constitutional rights,
be they enumerated or unemerated, the rightholders and the rights they hold are largely
determined by the U.S. Supreme Court precedents. As to rightsholders, the constitution itself
provides some direction to the court, as certain rights are held by “the people”27 while others
are held by “citizens”28 or by persons.29 The constitution provides no explicit direction when
rights spring from limits on governmental authority (e.g., no abridgement of free speech30 or

19

U.S. Const. amend. I.

20

U.S. Const. amend. I.

21

U.S. Const. amend. I.

22

U.S. Const. amend. XIII, §1.

23

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1

24

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1

25

U.S. Const. amend. XV, §1.

26

U.S. Const. amend XIII, §2; amend. XIV, §2

27

See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. IV (unreasonable search and seizure).

28

See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. XV, §1 (vote).

29

See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V (double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and due process, among others).

30

U.S. Const. amend. I.

7

religious practice31).32 Of course, high court precedents on rightsholders sometimes surprise, as
when free speech rights were accorded to corporations.33
All federal constitutional rights are “the supreme Law of the Land,” binding upon
“judges in every State.”34 For these rights, generally the rightsholders, the rights held, and the
enforcement avenues vary insignificantly interstate. There are some differences between the
states on the federal constitutional rights of those “accused” criminally,35 those contesting
illegal searches,36 and those with family‐related privacy interests in abortion37 and marriage.38
Yet for one federal constitutional right, the rightsholders ‐ though neither the
protections afforded by the right nor the enforcement of the right – significantly differ

31

U.S. Const. amend. I

32
For another review of the varying explicit federal constitutional approaches to federal constitutional rights
holders, see Constitutional Personhood, at 10-13.

See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (recognizing First
Amendment speech protections for corporations) and Kent Greenfield, “In Defense of Corporate Persons,” 30
Constitutional Commentary 309, 310 (2015) (reviewing criticisms while urging corporate personhood needs “a more
nuanced analysis” and suggesting “adjustments in corporate governance rather than constitutional law”).
33

34

U.S. Const. art. VI.

35
U.S. Const. amend. VI, as read in Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,149 (1968) (“Because we believe
the trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental . . . we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of
jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee.”).

U.S. Const. amend. IV, as read in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (passengers in searched auto with no
ownership interest in the auto or in property seized from the auto had no legitimate expectation of privacy; Fourth
Amendment rights are personal and enforceable only by those whose rights were infringed). See also New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338-343 (while distinguishing prisoners who “retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in
their cells,” per Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977), finding school children have some such
expectations, to be defined by the court via a “reasonableness standard” that applies nationwide).
36

Compare, e.g., 750 ILCS/1 et seq. (parents of unemancipated minor to be notified prior to minor’s abortion) with
Miss. Code 41-41-53 (consent of both parents before abortion performed unemancipated minor).
37

Compare, e.g., Colorado Code 14-2-106 (male over 16 can marry with consent of both parents) with Arkansas
Code 9-11-102 (male over 17 can marry with parent consent).
38

8

interstate. The relatively uniform federal constitutional approaches to the attributes of
parental childcare rights39 contrasts sharply with the allowance of interstate variations in
defining the parents possessing such rights. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes broad
discretion in the states to define federal constitutional parental childcare rightsholders,
resulting in varying state law definitions of parentage for federal constitutional childcare
purposes.
B. U.S. Supreme Court Precedents
While the leeway afforded state lawmakers is broad, their discretion to define federal
childcare parents is not boundless. A few U.S. Supreme Court precedents do limit state
definitional authority. Thus, to date, all women who bear children as a result of sex are parents
at birth with federal constitutional childcare interests.40 However, all men who, via sex,
impregnate women who later bear children are not necessarily such parents. Where birth
mothers are unmarried, biological fathers only have a federally‐protected opportunity interest
in establishing parenthood in order to be heard later on childcare,41 with the establishment
requisites largely left to state lawmakers.42 The requisites on exercising childcare parenthood

39

See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (parental childcare rights when grandparents seek visitation).

40
See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (no equal protection violation in treating biologically-tied men and
women differently in parentage laws on childcare).

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (in most cases state laws determine child custody issues).
[hereinafter Lehr].
41

See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256 (“rules governing . . . child custody . . . vary from state to state”) [hereinafter
Lehr].
42

9

opportunities vary significantly interstate.43 Incidentally, often legal parenthood under state law
varies intrastate in different contexts, as with who are parents for crimes and for child
support.44
For children born of adulterous sex to married birth mothers, under U.S. Supreme Court
precedents, states have discretion regarding whether to afford biological fathers any parental
childcare.45 Where states afford such opportunities notwithstanding marital paternity
presumptions, their requisites differ.46 For example, least one state generally denies any
parental childcare rights to such biological fathers, so that a biological father has no standing to
rebut a marital paternity presumption.47 Another state, however, recognizes state
constitutional parental childcare rights in such a biological father.48

See, e.g., Mary Beck, “Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database,” 25 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 1031,
1057–1068 (2002) (variations in state uses of putative father registries in adoption cases involving required notices
to unwed biological fathers).

43

See, e.g., State v. Paradis, 10 A. 3d 695 (Maine 2010) (biological father with no childcare opportunity may
nevertheless be prosecuted for sexual acts as a parent to his child/victim) and N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836
(6th Cir. 2004) (biological father, “no matter how removed he may be emotionally from the child,” may still have
“duties of support under state law” for the child whose children are placed for adoption by their mothers
44

45
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized such discretion in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(as long as a state law serves “a legitimate end by rational means”). Since Michael H., where the unwed biological
father was generally then not permitted under California law to seek to rebut a marital paternity presumption favored
by the married couple, id. at 124, even where the biological father had “an established parental relationship,” id. at
123, California law has changed so as to allow now some such rebuttals by unwed biological fathers, per Cal.
Family Code 7541 (a).

See, e.g., Paula Roberts, “Truth and Consequences: Part II, Questioning the Paternity of Marital Children,” 37
Family Law Quarterly 55 (2003), including “Appendix F: Recent State Statutes Allowing Paternity
Disestablishments of Marital Children,” 37 Family Law Quarterly 94 (2003).

46

See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A. 2d 1052, 1055 (Pa. 1999) (no rebuttal by unwed biological father where
marriage continues) [hereinafter Strauser].

47

See, e.g., Callender, 591 N.W. 2d at 190 (unwed biological father has “a liberty interest in challenging paternity”
under Iowa constitution). Marital presumption statutes are reviewed in June Carbone and Naomi Cahn, “Marriage,
Parentage and Child Support,” 45 Family Law Quarterly 219, 222-228 (2011).

48

10

Broad state lawmaking discretion on defining those with federal parental childcare
rights emanates, in particular, from three major U.S. Supreme Court precedents. One is Lehr v.
Robertson, where an unwed biological father of a child born of sex to an unwed mother sought
to participate in an adoption proceeding on behalf of the mother’s new husband.49 There, the
court recognized that state lawmakers could vary in their norms on denying such a father any
participation right and veto power. While the court recognized that the “intangible fibers that
connect parent and child” via biology “are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in
appropriate cases,” it concluded that in “the vast majority of cases, state law determines the
final outcome” when resolving “the legal problems arising from the parent‐child relationship.”50
Before and since Lehr, American states have varied regarding the participation rights of unwed
biological fathers in formal adoption proceedings.51
Another precedent is Michael H. v. Gerald D., where an unwed biological father of a
child born of sex to a married woman sought to undo the state marital paternity presumption
favoring the husband.52 The court ruled that California could deny, as it then did, the biological
father any opportunity interest in establishing childcare parentage, at least where the state

49

Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250.

Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256, citing Yazell, 382 U.S. at 351-3 and by saying “rules governing . . . child custody are
generally specified in statutory enactments that vary from state to state.” In Yazell, where no federal constitutional
protections were asserted, the court found “no need for uniformity and that solicitude for state interests, particularly
in the field of family . . . should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the
National Government . . . will suffer major damage if state law is applied.” Yazell, 382 U.S. at 352

50

See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, “Participation of Unwed Biological Fathers in Newborn Adoptions: Achieving
Substantive and Procedural Fairness,” 5 Journal of Law and Family Studies 223 (2003) (critically reviewing state
laws).
51

52

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113.

11

desired to promote the married couple’s wish to remain an intact nuclear family. While
California public policy has since changed,53 in Pennsylvania a comparable biological father can
be thwarted in his legal parentage pursuit by an intact nuclear family.54 Both before and since
Michael H., American states have varied in their approaches to establishing as well as
disestablishing marital parentage presumptions.55
The third high court precedent is Troxel v. Granville, where the attributes of superior
parental rights were at issue, and not the norms for establishing such rights.56 The case
involved grandparents who sought a court order on grandparent‐grandchild visits over parental
objections.57 In limiting judicial opportunity to override parental desires, a few opinions of a
splintered court recognized broad state lawmaking discretion on parentage and parental‐like
classes. There was mention of child visitation laws benefitting third parties (i.e., nonparents)

53

Cal. Family Code 7541(a) (rebutted with “evidence based on blood tests”).

Strauser, 726 A. 2d at 1054 (biological fathers cannot seek to rebut marital presumption favoring paternity in
husband as long as marriage is intact and spouses want to maintain presumption).
54

As to establishment, marital parentage presumptions can be based on birth or conception during marriage, as in
750 ILCS 45/5 (a). As to disestablishment, marital parentage presumptions may only be rebuttable by the wife or
husband, as in Oregon Stat. 109.070 (1)(b) and (2) and Utah Code 78-B-607(1) (assuming a commitment to stay
married and raising the child as an issue of the marriage), or may be subject to rebuttal by the biological father, as
recognized in In re Parentage of John M., 817 N.E. 2d 500 (Ill. 2004) (though standards are unclear) and in Interest
of Waites, 152 So. 3d 306 (Miss. 2014) (biological father can seek custody as long as no abandonment, unfitness or
the like). Recently, marital parentage presumptions in childcare settings have been applied by some lower courts to
lesbian spouses of birth mothers, even when the relevant statutes speak of husbands and presumed biological ties.
See, e.g., In re D.S., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 918, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
55

56
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. An earlier U.S. Supreme Court precedent in a case involving a childcare dispute between a
parent and a grandparent had suggested there could be no federal law on establishing parental rights. Ex Parte
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890) (“As to the right to the control and possession of this child, as it is contested by its
father and its grandfather, it is one in regard to which neither the congress of the United States, nor any authority of
the United States, has any special jurisdiction.”).
57

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61

12

via “gradations,”58 as well as of possible “de facto” parenthood,59 a parentage establishment
norm involving neither biological ties nor formal adoption.60 Before and since Troxel, American
state de facto (and comparable) parentage laws vary with respect to defining who become
federal constitutional childcare parents.61
There are significant interstate variations today in both parentage establishment and
disestablishment norms relevant to federal constitutional parental childcare rights. Parentage
establishment norms go by varying terms, including not only de facto parent, but also equitable
adoption, presumed parent, and parent by estoppel.62 Similarly, for parentage
disestablishment there are differing terms, including rebuttal and recission, usually depending
on how parentage was initially established.63
While there are distinct state law norms on establishing and disestablishing legal
parentage relevant to federal constitutional parental childcare, generally the holders of other
federal constitutional rights are uniform across state borders. The criminally accused, whose

58

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 93 (J. Scalia, dissenting)

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 101 (J. Kennedy, dissenting) (recognized by J. Scalia, in dissent, as a possible, but ill-advised,
“judicially crafted definition” of a federal constitutional childcare parent, id. at 92)
59

See, e.g., D.C. Code tit. 13, 16-831.01(1) (single parent’s “agreement” and residency in same household) and Del.
Code tit, 13, 8-201(c) (exercise of “parental responsibility “with” support and consent of the child’s parent”).
60

See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, “Parentage Law (R)Evolution: The Key Questions,” 59 Wayne Law Review 743,
752-763 (2013) [hereinafter Parentage Law (R)Evolution]. Of course, beyond Troxel there can be additional state
constitutional law protections of parental childcare interests. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W. 2d 573 (Tenn.
1993) (state constitutional right to privacy in parenting decisions).

61

62

See, e.g., Parentage Law (R)evolution, at 752-763.

Marital paternity presumptions are often subject to rebuttal, as in 750 ILCS 45/5(b), while voluntary paternity
acknowledgments are subject to recission, as driven by federal welfare subsidy policies found in 42 U.S.C. 666(a)
(5)(D).
63

13

rights include effective assistance of counsel, trial by jury, and speedy trial, 64 are not varied
widely interstate.65 Nor are there generally major interstate differences in religious
practioners;66 those subject only to reasonable searches;67 and gun toters.68
The U.S. Supreme Court is capable of crafting norms on federal constitutional parental
childcare rightsholders. With state terminations of existing parental childcare interests, the
high court has actively in set uniform federal constitutional norms.69 It cannot be that federal
constitutional childcare rightsholders necessarily must be left to state law definitions (e.g., per
the Tenth Amendment reservation of rights) since other personal privacy rightsholders, as with
the abortion,70 contraception,71 sexual conduct,72 and marriage,73 have been substantially
federalized by U.S. Supreme Court precedents.74

64

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

65

See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial right applies in state criminal cases).

U.S. Const. amend. I, as read in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 302 (like Congress, states may not enact
laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion).
66

67
U.S. Const. amend. IV, as read in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule applicable in state
criminal case) and Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (guidelines on when counsel must
be available for parents facing state initiatives to terminate parental rights).
68

U.S. Const. amend. II, as read in McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767.

See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 796 (1982) (clear and convincing evidence needed to prove child
“permanently neglected”) and Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (guidelines on when
counsel must be made available for parents facing state initiatives to terminate parental rights).
69

70

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

71

See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

72

See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

73

See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

Granted, not all federal constitutional childcare rights holders have been explicitly deemed subject to state law
definitions. To date the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed childcare rights when children are born of
74
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C. Congressional Enactments
The broad discretion held by American state lawmakers regarding parentage prompting
federal constitutional parental childcare75 generally has not been limited much by Congress.76
Congressional enforcement authority might be employed, however.77 Yet its reach is narrow.
Enforcement authority is only legitimate when employed to remedy and deter Fourteenth
Amendment violations, even if prophylactic in that the legislation prohibits “a somewhat
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s
text.”78 But such authority cannot work “a substantive change in the governing law,”79 meaning
there can be no “substantive redefinition” of U.S. Supreme Court precedents on Fourteenth
Amendment rights.80 As well, Congressional exercise of this enforcement authority requires “a
relevant history and pattern of constitutional violations.”81

assisted reproduction. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Mutcherson, “Procreative Pluralism,” 30 Berkeley J. of Gender, Law
& Justice 22 (2015) (argues for federal constitutional protections of assisted reproduction, though distinguishing
non-coital procreation between those wishing to procreate and parent and those wishing to procreate for profit).
Dean David D. Meyer recognized “the [federal] Constitution’s substantial indifference to how states assign parent
status.” “Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of Parenthood,” at 55, in “Reconceiving the
Family,” Robin Fretwell Wilson, editor (2006).
75

On what Congress has done (and should do) regarding family status determinations, see, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin,
“Federalism and Family Status,” 90 Indiana Law Journal 787 (2015).
76

77

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §5.

78

Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).

79

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).

80

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 519 (2004) [hereinafter Lane].

Lane, 541 U.S. at 521 (citing Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) and Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)).
81
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Congressional authority regarding federal expenditures also could be used to help unify
federal constitutional parent childcare norms.82 Congressional concerns regarding federally‐
subsidized state welfare assistance has already led to uniform voluntary paternity
acknowledgement standards across the country.83 But here, reimbursements of expended
federal welfare dollars were the targets, rather than establishments of more uniform parentage
norms.84
Congressional authority regarding interstate commerce,85 and perhaps other acts having
significant implications nationally,86 might also be employed, as with establishing guidelines for
sperm banks and assisted reproduction clinics providing services for people from throughout
the country.87 Yet such guidance may not (and likely could not, per the aforementioned limited
enforcement authority) address uniform parental childcare norms that include children born of
sex.88

82

U.S. Const. art. I, §8 (congressional taxing and spending authority).

See, e.g., For Those Not John Edwards, at 56 (states have applied the Congressional guidelines on voluntary
parentage acknowledgements both in and outside of welfare settings).
83

84

For Those Not John Edwards, at 56-59.

85

U.S. Const. art. I, §8

Consider, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, §8 (Congress shall “make all laws . . . necessary and proper for carrying into
execution” the specifically enumerated legislative powers).

86

For how such guidelines might operate, see, e.g., Andrea Preisler, “Assisted Reproductive Technology: The
Dangers of an Unregulated Market and the Need for Reform,” 15 DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 213 (2013)
and Benjamin B. Williams, “Screening for Children: Choice and Chance in the ‘Wild West’ of Reproductive
Medicine,” 79 George Washington Law Review 1305 (2011).
87

88
Reviews of how Congress has already utilized its legislative authority in enforcement, spending, and interstate
commerce matters to unify family laws in the United States appear in Ann Laquer Estin, “Sharing Governance:
Family Law in Congress and the States,” 18 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 267(2009) (concluding that
while Congress has substantial authority over family law matters, it should limit its national family legislation to
subjects for which there is broad political consensus and strong state support). See also Elizabeth G. Patterson,
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III.

The Failure to Justify Deferrals to State Lawmaking on Federal Constitutional
Childcare Parents

The U.S. Supreme Court has often recognized federal constitutional parental childcare
as “fundamental.”89 Yet the court has not clearly explained why the rightsholders for this right
are substantially defined by state lawmakers. The state laws on rightsholders, typically male for
now (though this is changing given expanding uses of assisted reproduction, including
surrogacy), frequently differ. Husbands of birth mothers vary in their federally protected
childcare interests per state presumed parent laws.90 So do unwed biological fathers who
conceive children by consensual sex with married women.91 State laws on childcare
rightsholders vary widely today for both parentage establishment and disestablishment.92

“Unintended Consequences: Why Congress Should Tread Lightly When Entering the Field of Family Law,” 25
Georgia State University Law Review 397 (2008) (reviewing Congressional initiatives conditioning the receipt of
federal funds on family law mandates) [hereinafter Unintended Consequences].
89
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“fundamental rights and interests” include “the
traditional interest of parents with respect to religious upbringing”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982)
(“fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody and management of their child”); and
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“fundamental rights and liberty interests” include the right “to
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children”). See also Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W. 3d 573, 578-579 (Tenn.
1993) (reviewing other U.S. Supreme Court precedents, though employing a state constitutional privacy analysis to
find application of the Grandparents’ Visitation Act in the case was unconstitutional).

For example, the state laws on the marital presumptions recognizing husbands as legal fathers vary in their
establishment standards. Compare, e.g., Nev. Stat. 126.051 (1)(a) (husband is presumed father of child “born during
the marriage”), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 64, 6(a)(1) (similar) and Ind. Code 31-14-7-1 (B) (similar) to Mo. Code,
Family Law 5-1027(c)(1) (presumed father is “man to whom” child’s “mother was married at the time of
conception”) and Ariz. Rev. Stat. 25-814(A)(1) (presumed father is man to whom birth mother was married at any
time in the ten months immediately preceding birth).

90

For example, where their mates are married to other men, state laws on the rebutting of the marital paternity
presumptions favoring husbands by biological fathers vary. Compare, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2(Cal. 2004)
(biological father and husband can each be presumed fathers, often prompting a judicial decision on which
presumption should be maintained) [hereinafter Jesusa V.] to Utah Code 78B-15-607(1) (biological father cannot
challenge marital paternity presumption where husband and wife are committed to raising “the child as issue of the
marriage”).
91

Besides supra notes 46 (marital parentage presumptions), 53-55 (marital parentage presumptions), and 61-62 (de
facto, presumed, and equitable parentage), see, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness and Zachary Townsend, “For Those Not John
92
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Explanatory failures by the U.S. Supreme Court are illustrated with observations from
the 2000 Troxel case on parental childcare where grandparents sought court‐ordered child
visitation over parental objection. Court statements recognizing broad state lawmaking
authority on parentage prompting federal constitutional childcare are made without significant
judicial elaborations on policy and without judicial references to relevant precedents. In
dissent, Justice Stevens said: “It is indisputably the business of the States, rather than a federal
court employing a national standard, to assess in the first instance the relative importance of
the conflicting interests that give rise to disputes such as this.”93 He noted a few high court
precedents, including one saying it is best to leave “matters involving competing and
multifaceted social and policy decisions” to “local decisionmaking,” which he deemed meant
that “caution” for the court was “never more essential than in the realm of family and intimate
relations.”94 He did not explain why the high court was not as cautious regarding the family
relations areas of abortion and contraception.
Justice Scalia, also in dissent, deemed “state legislatures” far better suited than the
court to craft “definitions of parents” possessing the “unenumerated parental rights”
recognized in federal constitutional precedents (which he “would not now overrule”).95

Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth,” 40 Univ. of Baltimore L.Rev. 53 (2010)
(demonstrating differences in American state laws on establishing and recognizing voluntary paternity
acknowledgments) [hereinafter For Those Not John Edwards].
93

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 90.

94

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91 and n. 10 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)).

95

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92-3.
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And Justice Kennedy, in dissent, recognized that one fit parent’s federal constitutional
childcare rights might be limited by “a de facto parent” doctrine, where the “family courts in
the 50 states . . . are best situated to consider the unpredictable, yet inevitable, issues that
arise.”96 This observation was founded on the preexisting diversity subject matter jurisdiction
limit on federal district courts issuing divorce, alimony, or child custody decrees.97
Similar statements appear beyond in dissents and grandparent visitation settings. In an
adoption case, a U.S. Supreme Court majority simply observed that in “the vast majority of
cases,” state laws govern “the legal problems arising from the parent‐child relationship.”98 In a
property setting involving “a conflict between federal and state rules for the allocation of a
federal entitlement,” a U.S. Supreme Court majority observed state “family and family‐property
law” must do “major damage” to “clear and substantial federal interests” before such a law will
be overridden.99 While perhaps in the past the harms caused by interstate parentage law
variations were not “major,” today there is “major damage” as new forms of biological and
96

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 101 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-4 (1992) [hereinafter Ankenbrandt]).

Justice Kennedy, more particularly, relied upon Ankenbrandt, id., a diversity jurisdiction case, to opine: the
federal constitutional childcare protections “must be elaborated with care, using the discipline and instruction of the
case law system. We must keep in mind that family courts in the 50 states confront these factual variations [i.e., in
cases between strangers and de facto parents seeking court-ordered childcare over existing parents’ objections] each
day, and are best situated to consider the unpredictable, yet inevitable, issues that arise.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 100101.
97

In Ankenbrandt, Id., the court was only concerned with the long history of absence of federal court subject matter
jurisdiction over divorce, alimony and child custody decrees and the special state court proficiencies to monitor
compliance with such decrees, and not with the absence of federal court authority to define federal constitutional
rights holders. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703-704.
98

Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256.

Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581-582 (1979) (citing U.S. v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)
[hereinafter Yazell]). See also Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (employing same language from these two
cases in a different property setting) and Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013) (employing Hisquierdo in
a different property setting).
99
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nonbiological parentage have risen sharply, particularly with the increases in the numbers of
nonmartial children,100 children born of assisted reproduction technologies101, and children
“informally” adopted.102
Commentaries on these high court pronouncements on deference generally are
unsatisfactory and often conclusory.103 One author wrote:
Some federal activity in the family law realm is unavoidable and even desirable . . .
The federal attention can become pernicious, however, if federal program
requirements demand changes in state law that could disrupt the fabric of family
law and policy in a state. Because family policy is closely connected to community
norms and local social cohesion, such disruptions can have deleterious social effects
that were neither anticipated nor desired by Congress. These disruptions can be,
and sometimes are, avoided by a less prescriptive federal approach.104

100

See, e.g., Katherine K. Baker, “Bionomativity and the Construction of Parenthood,” 42 Georgia Law Review 649,
652 n. 9 (2008); Elizabeth Wildsmith, Nicole R. Steward‐Streng and Jenniefer Manlove, 2011 Child Trends, Nov.
2011 (www.childtrends.org) (“In 2009, 41 percent of all births (about 1.7 million) occurred outside of marriage,
compared with 18 percent of all births in 1990 and just 11 percent of all births in 1970,”); and Joyce A. Martin et
al., National Vital Statistics Reports, U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, at 38‐40, (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr64_01.pdf.
101

On the history of assisted human reproduction (and recent growth in free private sperm donation), see Note,
“Who’s Your Daddy? Defining Paternity Rights in the Context of Free, Private Sperm Donation,” 54 William and
Mary Law Review 1715, 1719‐1725 (2013). On the increases in assisted human reproduction on a “do it yourself
basis, making governmental regulation more difficult, see, e.g., A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761 (Fla. App. 2d 2013).

102

Herein, “informal adoptions” most significantly include recognitions of a second part for a child with a single
parent where the second parent is on equal footing with the established parent and achieves parental status
without formal adoption through parental-like acts, utilizing such doctrines as presumed or de facto parenthood. On
the rise of such doctrines, see, e.g., Parentage Law (R) Evolution, at 753-763.

See, e.g, Katherine K. Baker, “Marriage and Parenthood as Statutes and Rights: The Growing, Problematic and
Possibly Constitutional Trend to Disaggregate Family Status from Family Rights,” 71 Ohio State Law Journal 127,
151 (2010) (“few people guestion the state’s ability to honor, or not, surrogacy contracts; to recognize, or not
second-parent adoption; and to determine, for the most part, who is entitled to parental status”).

103

“Unintended Consequences,” at 399. See also id. at 433 (in limiting federal lawmaking on family matters the U.S.
Supreme Court recognizes “community morality, order and cohesion”).

104
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Yet the avoidance of “deleterious social effects” that upset “community norms and local social
cohesion” is not so important as to preclude federal constitutional norms on rightsholders
implicating “family policy” in such realms as abortion, sexual conduct and same sex marriage.105
In a 1992 ruling, often relied upon in judicial opinions where public policy explanations
are otherwise wanting, the U.S. Supreme Court did articulate a cogent rationale for limiting
federal district court subject matter jurisdiction in certain “family policy” cases. It deemed such
jurisdiction could not be exercised when “divorce and alimony decrees and child custody
orders” are sought. It explained:
Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves retention of jurisdiction
by the court and deployment of social workers to monitor compliance. As a
matter of judicial economy, state courts are more eminently suited to work of
this type than are federal courts, which lack the close association with state and
local government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of
conflicts over divorce, alimony and child custody decrees. Moreover, as a matter
of judicial expertise, it makes far more sense to retain the rule that federal
courts lack power to issue these types of decrees because of the special
proficiency developed by state tribunals. 106
Yet the more particular articulation of who are federal constitutional childcare rightholders,
without determining which parent has custody, visitation, parenting time or the like, should
prompt no concerns over later monitoring; implicate no ties to local government organizations;
and, require no judicial expertise developed only in state courts.

Other critics of the “less prescriptive federal approach” to family law issues focus on matters outside of federal
constitutional childcare parents. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, “The Perils of Family Law Localism,” 48 U.C. Davis
Law Review 623 (2014) (reviewing the critics).

105

106

Id. at 703-704.
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This rationale from 1992 sometimes is read too generally and taken out of context.
Thus, a U.S. Court of Appeals in 2015 declared: “And if plaintiff requests that a federal court
determine who should have care and control of a child, then that request is outside the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.”107 Yet it recognized, as well, that the 1992 precedent was
limited to barriers to federal court resolutions of who should have custody as only here would
there often be “continuing judicial supervision of a volatile family situation” and the
“deployment of social workers to monitor compliance.”108 Fact dependent issues of who should
be awarded childcare differ from general norms on who can seek childcare. With the latter,
there is no need for continuing jurisdiction or deployment of social workers.
IV.

The Results of and the Problems With Deferring to State Lawmaking
A. The Results

The absence of federal laws significantly limiting state lawmaking on who may be
federal constitutional parental childcaretakers has resulted in a proliferation of widely varying
state parentage laws relevant to federal constitutional childcare. Divergence arises, in part, due
to the varied separation of powers approaches to state judicial common lawmaking when
statutes are wholly silent or incomplete,109 as they often are, as well as to varied approaches to

107

Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F. 3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Chevalier].

Chevalier, 803 F. 3d at 794 (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703-704). See also Alexander v. Rosen, 804 F. 3d
1203 (6th Cir. 2015) (Chevalier deemed applicable to a narrow range of cases, including those involving who gets
child custody and the calculation of child support payments).

108

109
Compare, e.g., Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-19 (while “parenthood is meant to be defined by the
Legislature,” after 13 years of noting a statutory need for a de facto parent doctrine, several justices conclude “we
must provide some guide”) (plurality opinion) [hereinafter Pitts] to Moreau v. Sylvester, 2014 VT 31, ¶¶ 25-26
(declining to formulate a nonstatutory de facto parent doctrine though courts elsewhere filled the “perceived
vacuum”) [hereinafter Moreau]. Effective July 1, 2016, a new Parentage Act took effect in Maine. 19-A Maine Stat.
1831 et. seq.
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recognizing state constitutional parental childcare rights.110 Beyond these variations there are
significant interstate differences in the substantive parentage childcare laws grounded on
biological ties to children, functional parenthood, and contractual parentage.
i.

Biological Ties

On the import of biological ties for childcare purposes, state law variations appear both
in and outside of assisted human reproduction (AHR) settings. For AHR involving surrogates,
that is, women giving birth who do not intend to parent, including women who utilize the eggs
of other women who do intend to parent, the surrogates may or may not be the legal parents
at birth. Some states effectively allow preconception waivers of any parental rights by
surrogates,111 as well as adoptions of any future children by intended parents, who may or may

See, e.g., Jensen v. Cunningham, 250 P. 3d 465, 483-4 (Utah 2011) (state constitutional due process liberty
interest of a parent “to maintain ties to his or her child,” which includes “a fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care and control of their children”); Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W. 2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999) (unwed
biological father of child born of sex to a woman married to another had an Iowa constitutional due process “liberty”
interest in challenging husband’s paternity); and LP v. LF, 338 P. 3d 908, 921 (Wyoming 2014) (decling to adopt de
facto parentage or parentage by estoppel doctrine, “leaving instead that important policy decision to the Wyoming
Legislature”). On when state constitutions will more likely be read to provide broader protections of individual
rights, see, e.g., Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 2016 WL 2755297 (Kansas 2016) (coextensive
interpretations of federal and state constitutions generally occur “only when the provisions themselves are similar”).

110

See, e.g., Fla. 742.15 (1) and (2) (C) (“prior to engaging in gestational surrogacy, a binding and enforceable
gestational contract shall be made “wherein typically a “gestational surrogate agrees to relinquish any parental rights
upon the child’s birth”); 750 ILCS 47/25 (b) (2) and (c) (1) (ii) (similar); and N.H. Stat. 168-B:16 (I) (“before the
procedure to impregnate the surrogate,” the surrogate agreement is “judicially preauthorized”). Where the
gestational surrogates are married, sometimes their spouses may also contractually waive any parental rights prior to
conception. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 47/25(b)(2)(i) (“gestational surrogacy contract” shall be executed by the
“gestational surrogate’s husband”) and N.H. Stat. 168-B:4 (husband of gestational surrogate only secures parental
rights if the requirements of N.H. Stat. 168-B:16-27 are met); Fla. Stat. 742.13 (7) (gestational surrogacy contract
between “gestational surrogate and the commissioning couple”); and Fla. Stat. 742.15 (c) (“gestational surrogate
agrees to relinquish any parental rights upon the child’s birth”).

111
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not need to have been married 112 or to have contributed genetic material prompting birth.113
Other states deny enforcement of surrogacy pacts.114
For AHR where the birth mothers intend to parent, their husbands may or may not be
legal parents, depending on whether their sperm was employed.115 For AHR births to unwed
mothers, sperm donors who intend to parent any later born child may or may not be legal
parents if relevant statutes otherwise bar paternity for such donors.116
Biological ties also prompt variations in state parentage laws when children are born of
sex. While presumed biological ties in husbands whose wives give birth generally result in legal
paternity,117 the timing of the necessary marriage differs interstate. State legislators have

112

See, e.g., Nevada Stat. 126. 045.

See, e.g., 750 ILCS 47/20 (b) (where there are 2 intended parents, at least one must contribute gametes) and Fla.
Stat. 742.15 (2)(e) (gestational surrogate must agree to “assume parental responsibilities . . . if it is determined that
neither of the commissioning couple is the genetic parent”).

113

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws 722.855; Ariz. Stat. 25-218 (A); and Indiana Code 31-20-1-1. For a review of the
“wide spectrum of legal regimes” on surrogacy in the United States, see Peter Nicolas, “Straddling the Columbia: A
Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on Circumventing Washington State’s Criminal Prohibition on
Compensated Surrogacy,” 89 Washington L. Rev. 1235, 1239 – 1245 (2014) [hereinafter Nicolas].

114

See, e.g., 750 ILCS 40/3 (differing consent requirements for husbands who are and are not the sperm donors).
Thus husbands in nonsurrogacy AHR settings may not always be presumed biological fathers of children born to
their wives. Elsewhere, husbands are presumed fathers if they consent in the same way, regarless of whether or not
their sperm was used. See, e.g., Maryland Code, Estates and Trusts 1-206(b), employed in a divorce/child support
setting in Sieglein v. Schmidt, 120 A. 3d 790 (Md. 2015).
115

Compare, e.g., Steven S. v. Deborah D., 127 Cal. App. 4th 319, 326 (Cal. 2d 2005) (no paternity for sperm donor
regardless of intent) to C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E. 2d 523, 525 (Ohio Comm. Pleas 1994) and In interest of R.C., 775 P.
2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) [hereinafter R.C.].

116

On marital paternity presumptions generally, see e.g., Carbone and Cahn, “Marriage, Parentage and Child
Support,” 45 Family Law Quarterly 219 (2011). The varying state laws are described in Gartner v. Iowa Dept. of
Public Health, 830 N.W. 2d 335, 354 n.1 (Iowa 2013).

117
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alternatively used the timing of marriage relative to conception, pregnancy and/or birth.118
Further, there are variations in the standing of those who can disestablish parentage by
challenging marital parentage presumptions.119
ii.

Functional Parenthood

As to functional parenthood for federal childcare purposes, where there are parental‐
like acts and where there need not be either biological ties or any parentage contract, state
laws vary in naming the doctrines. There are statutes and judicial precedents on, e.g., de facto
parents and presumed parents.120
More importantly, there are widely varying standards on functional parenthood. For
example, some state laws on “presumed” parentage outside of marriage require residency with
the child since birth,121 while others require no minimum period of household residency122 or
no household residency at all.123 Some state laws recognize a functional parent where there

Compare, e.g., Nev. Stat. 126.051 (a)(“born during marriage”) to Mo. Code, Family Law 5-1027 (c)(1) (married
at time of conception) and Ariz. Stat. 25-814 (A)(1) (“married at any time” in the ten months immediately preceding
the birth).
118

Compare, e.g., B.C. v. J.S.U., 158 So. 2d 464 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (biological father of child born to woman
married to another man cannot assert parentage when husband persists in his presumption of paternity) and Strauser
v. Stahr, 726 A. 2d 1052 (Pa. 1999) (similar) to Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 11 (both husband and biological father of child
born to wife can be “presumed” parents, where court often must rebut one of the two presumptions) and In re
Waites, 152 So. 3d 306 (Miss. 2014) (for child born into marriage, unwed biological father nevertheless entitled to
“natural parent presumption”).

119

See, e.g., Parentage Law (R)Evolution, at 752-763 (overview of evolving state parentage laws). In Delaware,
there are statutory parents both via presumptions, Del. Code tit. 13, 8-204(5), and de facto status, Del. Code tit. 13,
8-201 (c).

120

121

See, e.g., Texas Code 160.204 (a)(5) and Wash. Code 26.26 116 (2).

See, e.g., Mont. Code. 40-6-105 (d)(1) (receipt into home), Colorado Stat. 19-4-105 (1)(d) (similar) and N.J. Stat.
9:14-43 (a)(4) (similar).

122

123

See, e.g., Alabama Code 26-17-204 (a)(5) (presumed parent establishes “a significant parental relationship”).
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already exist, and will remain, two other parents under law.124 Incidentally, in settings where
neither biological ties nor earlier functioning as a parent result in current childcare
opportunities, child support obligations still can be imposed.125
iii.

Contractual Parentage

As to contractual parentage for childcare purposes, there are also varied state laws.
With AHR nonsurrogacy, some state statutes speak to both marital and nonmarital settings,126
while others expressly address only the consent of a husband in writing to parenthood when his
wife seeks to deliver a child born with anonymously‐donated sperm.127 When statutes are not
comprehensive of all AHR nonsurrogacy births, courts can extend contractual parentage
opportunities, as with unwed sperm donors who are recognized as childcare parents128 and
with husbands recognized as childcare parents when their wives conceive without medical
assistance via sperm donated by one known to the married couple.129 Other states have

See, e.g., California Family Code 7612 (c) (if failure to recognize three parents would be “detrimental to the
child”) and Maine Stat. 1851 (1), 1881 (1)(A), 1891(3) (parents include birth mother, husband as presumed parent,
and de facto parent [via, e.g., residence, consistent “caretaking” and “bonded and dependent relationship”], together
with Maine Stat. 1891 (5) (adjudication of de facto parentage “does not disestablish the parentage” of others).
124

125

See, e.g., N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F. 3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004) and Baby A., 944 So. 2d 380 (Fla. App. 2006).

See, e.g., Ohio Code 3111.89 (“non-spousal artificial insemination for the purpose of impregnating a woman so
that she can bear a child she intends to raise as her child” through using “the semen of a man who is not her
husband”). “Due process safeguards,” however, may prompt some sperm donors under the statue to be fathers
under. See, e.g., C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Comm. Pl., Cuyahoga Cty., 1994) [hereinafter C.O.]. See
also Maine Stat. 1921 et seq. (assisted reproduction outside marital setting) and Maine Stat. 1931 et seq. (gestational
carrier agreements), as well as California Family Code 7613 (AHR outside surrogacy) and California Family Code
7962 (AHR with gestational carriers).
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See, e.g., 750 ILCS 40/3(a) (per (b), sperm donor not treated as “natural father” unless his wife is inseminated)
and Arkansas Code 9-10-201 (A). .
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128

See, e.g., Breit v. Mason 718 S.E. 2d 482 (Va. App. 2011).

See, e.g., Engelking v. Engelking, 982 N.E. 2d 326 (Ind. App. 2013) (relying on a husband’s “voluntary consent”
to artificial insemination as well as the statute on a “child of the marriage”).
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statutes outside marital settings, as when unwed women can secure legal parentage via an AHR
birth where sperm donors generally are not parents under law.
In AHR surrogacy settings, some state laws explicitly allow husbands of projected
surrogates to consent in writing to an absence of future legal paternity.130 Some state laws
allow nonegg or nonsemen donors to become legal parents via surrogacy pacts,131 while others
do not.132 Some state laws prohibit surrogacy contracts altogether.133 Some states allow men
alone to become legal parents via AHR surrogacy.134 On the range of state laws, one judge,
upon reviewing existing laws and commentaries, concluded:
Beyond the mere fact that there is no clear majority approach to surrogacy
among the states that have acted, many states still have said virtually nothing on
the topic. Among those that have acted, the legislative approach varies
significantly from state to state.135

130

See, e.g., Arkansas Code 9-10-201 (b)-(c).

See, e.g., Nevada. Stat. 126. 045 (only two persons in “a valid marriage” may “contract with a surrogate”);
Florida Stat. 742.15; and 750 ILCS 47/20(b) (where there are 2 intended parents, at least one must contribute
gametes and there must be “a medical need”). See also In re Baby S., 2015 WL 7432454 (Pa. Super. 2015) (nonegg
donor is legal mother of child born to surrogate though there was no statute on point).

131

See, e.g., In re T.J.S., 16 A. 3d 386 (N.J. Super. App. 2011) (wife of sperm donor who employed a surrogate
needed to adopt to become a parent under law as she was not an ovum donor), aff’d. by equally divided court, 54 A.
3d 263 (N.J. 2012).
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See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws 722.855; Arizona Stat. 25-218(A) (no person may enter into a “surrogate parentage
contract”); and Indiana Code 31-20-1-1.

133

See, e.g., Arkansas Code 9-10-201 (unwed sperm donors can utilize surrogates) and In re Roberto D.B, 923 A.2d
115 (Md. 2007) (similar). Compare In re Paternity and Maternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. App. 2013)
(unwed sperm donor can disestablish paternity of surrogate’s husband who consented to disestablishment, but could
not disestablish maternity of surrogate who gave birth even though she too had agreed to disestablishment; court
reasoned there would otherwise be no legal second parent).

134

In re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W. 2d 634, 656 (Wisc. 2013) (C.J. Abrahamson, concurring). American state
surrogacy laws are reviewed in Leora I. Gabrey, Note, “Procreating Without Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the Need for
a Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme,” 45 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 415 (2012); Joseph F.
Morrissey, “Surrogacy: The Process, the Law and the Contracts,” 51 Willamette Law Review 459, 486-503 (2015);
and Kindregan and McBrien, at 157-203 (also reviewing international surrogacy laws, at 203-211).
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Outside of AHR, there are significant variations in state laws on contracts involving legal
parenthood. Thus, only some state laws afford legal parenthood to a second parent where an
existing single parent expressly supports and consents to the second parent’s earlier
childcaretaking.136 Only some states afford legal parenthood to a second parent arising from, at
best, a single parent’s passive acquiescence.137
B. The Problems
Should federal constitutional childcare rightsholders, now guided by widely varying state
law norms on parentage establishment and disestablishment, continue to be so different? The
answer is no if one believes equality principles demand that federal constitutional childcare
rightsholders should be comparably defined regardless of where they live.138 Beyond equality,
current American state law differences have prompted other significant problems. One
problem is that many Americans do not understand the import of the broad state parentage
lawmaking discretion and the resulting interstate variations in parental childcare opportunities
(and responsibilities). Like Maury Povich, many believe that legal parentage depends only upon

See, e.g., Del. Code. tit. 13, 8-201 (c) (de facto parent where there is the “support and consent” of the child’s
single parent), as read in Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A. 3d 730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (statute is unconstitutional if
read to allow a de facto parent where there already exist two fit parents)[hereinafter Bancroft]. Compare Barone v.
Chapman Cleland, 10 N.Y. S. 3d 380 (N.Y. Sup. App. 4th 2015) (same sex partner of birth mother has no childcare
interest as “equitable estoppel” does not bar mother’s superior childcare rights when partnership dissolves, though
partner had co-parented for some time with the birth mother’s consent).

136

See, e.g., S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 and II (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (employing Cal. Family Code 7611 (d),
presumed second parent need not be intended by existing parent to “obtain any legal rights,” but any second parent
must have received child into the home and openly held out the child as one’s own).

137

The interstate variations on who are parents in childcare settings seemingly are subject to Fifth Amendment Due
Process analysis, where the focus would likely be on Congressional failures regarding comparably situated child
caretakers (and not on U.S. Supreme Court failures).
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biology or formal adoption. While over time a better understanding might develop, there are
further problems.
Many Americans do not understand that, from state to state, differing terms can have
comparable meanings and similar terms can have differing meanings. For example, de facto
parenthood in one state can be comparable to presumed parenthood in a second state, while
presumed parenthood can have varied meanings in different states.139 New U.S. Supreme Court
precedents on federal constitutional childcare parents likely will prompt more unified
approaches to American state parental childcare nomenclature.
Another problem involves the uncertainties about legal parentage when people move
across borders where very different parentage norms apply. For example, a person can meet
the de facto parent norm in State A, followed by the child’s move to State B where there is no
such norm. Typically in a later childcare dispute in State B, a court in State B will apply the
parentage laws of State B though most, if not all, of the childcare relevant to any de facto
parentage in the person left behind in State A occurred in State A.140 As legal parentage norms
untied to biology and formal adoption become more widespread and better known, savvy

See, e.g., Parentage Law (R)Evolution, at 752-763 and Gartner v. Iowa Department of Public Health, 2013 WL
1856789, n.1 (Iowa 2013) (demonstrating 3 separate categories of American state statutes on parentage
presumption).

139

See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, “Choosing Among Imprecise American State Parentage Laws,” 76 Louisiana Law
Review 481 (2015) (criticizing this approach and suggesting ways state courts should employ their choice of law
principles when parentage norms differ between interested states).
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lawyers will likely prompt their clients to make forum shopping moves for such purposes as
avoiding shared childcare or child support.141
Other problems spring from state law variations on those possessing federal parental
childcare rights. Many family members, even if they understand their own state parentage
laws and even with no crossborder moves, remain uncertain as to who is a parent. Unlike
parentage arising from marriage, a birth certificate, a voluntary parentage acknowledgement,
or a formal adoption, de facto legal parentage and its like are imprecise in that they arise from
such occurrences as “parental‐like” acts or “bonded and dependent relationships,” which must
be judicially assessed after the fact. 142 There will often be great uncertainty about how judges
will rule in particular cases, even if the fuzzy legal norms on imprecise parentage are known.
Subjectivity reigns, with few objective standards like those existing in formal adoption settings
(e.g., certain criminal convictions stand as absolute barriers).143 Uncertainty as to parentage
often will make more difficult the very personal decisions on matters like estate planning, gifts,
religious upbringing, schooling, and marriage. New federal norms can mitigate, if not eliminate,
this uncertainty.144

See, e.g., Nicolas, at 1238-1239 (“we had to look outside of the state” for “a more favorable atmosphere for
surrogacy”).

141

See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 13, 8-201 (c) (de facto parent status). See also Ala. Code 26-17-204 (a)(5) (presumed
parent provides “emotional and financial support”) and Wash. Code 26.26.116 (2)(presumed parent holds out child
“as her own”).

142

For an argument on the need for more objective standards in imprecise parentage settings, see Jeffrey A. Parness,
“Formalities for Informal Adoptions,” 43 Capital Univ. L. Rev. 373 (2015) [hereinafter Informal Adoptions].

143

On how lawyers and judges can better handle claims implicating imprecise parentage laws, See Jeffery A.
Parness, “Challenges in Handling Imprecise Parentage Matters,” 28 Journal of the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers 401 (2015).
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Legal parentage uncertaintiescan arise even when parties have earlier agreed on
parentage. Such uncertainty, for example, pervades assisted reproduction settings, as well as
settings involving childcare agreements for children born of sex. In the absence of unifying
federal norms, states vary in their approaches to agreements involving future parentage.145
Not all state courts in all settings enforce childcare pacts even where the best interests of
children will be promoted. Some state courts deny enforcement simply because the
legislatures have not affirmatively acted to recognize such agreements, though such pacts have
not been deemed invalid by statute.146 Significant uncertainties on possible enforcement will
continue until General Assemblies act. Major nationwide variations will likely remain until
supreme federal laws operate. Clearly, the parentage standardization initiatives of the Uniform
Commission,147 the America Bar Association148 and the American Law Institute149 have not
prompted significant interstate agreements

Compare, e.g., Arkansas Code 9-10-201(b)-(c) (use of surrogate mothers allowed) to Michigan Comp. Laws
722.855 (“surrogate contract is void and unenforceable”).

145

Consider, e.g., the differing judicial approaches to recognizing de facto parent status in the absence of legislation.
See Pitts, 2014 ME at ¶¶18-19 (plurality opinion), where the court said:

146

Parenthood is meant to be defined by the legislature . . . although we have been discussing de facto
parenthood for almost thirteen years, there is currently no Maine statutory reference . . . In the absence of
Legislative action . . . we must provide some guidance.
Compare Moreau, 2014 VT at ¶¶25 and 26 (declining the opportunity to formulate a nonstatutory de facto parent
doctrine as “the Legislature is better equipped”). And see LP v. LF, 338 P.3d 908, 921 (Wyoming 2014) (declining
to adopt common law de facto parentage or parentage by estoppel).
See, e.g., The Uniform Parentage Act, promulgated in 1973, revised in 2000, and amended in 2003, available at
www.uniformlaws.org
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See, e.g., The Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, approved by the American Bar
Association House of Delegates in February 2008 and reviewed in Kindregan and McBrien, at 371-400.

148

See, e.g., The American Law Institute, Principles of Law, Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations
(2000), whose impact was assessed in Robin Fretwell Wilson and Michael Clisham, “American Law Institute’s
149

31

V.

Possible New Congressional Limits on State Lawmaking

Greater certainty about legal parentage may not be wholly dependent upon a unified
federal constitutional approach to federal childcare rightsholders. Congress could redo the
voluntary paternity acknowledgement process so as to (more) clearly include only men who
actually have, or reasonably believe they have, biological ties to the acknowledged children.150
Congress could also make acknowledgements more easily rescindable where there are no
biological ties, as by eliminating or extending the current 60 day period for rescissions in the
absence of fraud, duress or mistake of fact.151
Congress could, in the alternative, expand the voluntary acknowledgement process to
include certain men and women with no biological ties, establishing a new form of informal
adoption, especially for children born of sex to unwed mothers or born of AHR to a woman in a
same‐sex relationship.152
The Congressional acknowledgement process was largely developed to secure greater
reimbursements of governmental welfare aid expended to birth mothers on behalf of their
children.153 This goal could be extended to reimbursements from the children’s nonbiological

Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory
Footnote?”, 42 Family Law Quarterly 573 (2008) (finding no significant effect to date).
Currently state laws and their acknowledgment forms vary on whether signers must affirmatively express beliefs
as to likely biological ties. For Those Not John Edwards, at 72-73.
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42 U.S.C. 666(a) (5) (D) (ii) (I)-(II).

See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, “Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples”, 20 J. Gender
Social Policy & Law 467 (2012) and Jayna Morse Cacioppo, Note, “Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity:
Should Biology Play a Role in Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?”, 38 Indiana Law Review 479 (2005).

152

153

For Those Not John Edwards, at 56-59.
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parental‐like figures who are not full legal parents, at least while they continue to act in
parental‐like ways. As suggested by one voice in Troxel, there could be gradations of
nonparents as well as carefully crafted parentage definitions.154
Such Congressional revamps, however, are ill‐advised. New constraints on
acknowledgments and easier rescission standards would often harm children and upset settled
familial expectations. New expansions of acknowledgement opportunities may not prompt
greater welfare payment reimbursements, but prompt the circumvention of child protection
safeguards attending formal adoptions.155
Beyond welfare reimbursements, states have (wisely) chosen to employ the
Congressional voluntary acknowledgment processes for children whose birth mothers have not
sought, and will not likely seek, welfare assistance.156 To date, there have emerged no proposed
model codes or uniform laws in these settings that could prompt greater national uniformity.
Some posit that greater certainty on legal parentage may be attained by explicit
Congressional expansions of its voluntary acknowledgement process to children with no ties to
governmental welfare, as well as to parental‐like figures with no biological or formal adoptive
ties. Yet nationalization of such parentage norms outside of federal constitutional judicial
precedents seemingly is foreclosed by the Article I and other limits on Congressional authority,
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Troxel, 560 U.S. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

155

See, e.g., Informal Adoptions, at 403-404.

156

For Those Not John Edwards, at 63-87 (comparing state voluntary acknowledgment laws).
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as well as by the related Tenth Amendment’s reservation of certain powers to the states.157
Parents of, and parental‐like figures for, children, who were born of sex, who have not
benefitted personally from public assistance programs, and who have always lived in a single
state where conception and birth occurred, are not so tied to interstate commerce that
Congressional power is constitutionally authorized. Congressional enforcement of federal
constitutional rights,158 with the rights defined by U.S. Supreme Court precedents, typically
cannot encompass statutory expansions of the rights or the rightsholders.159
Comparably, Congressional action nationalizing the norms on parentage presumptions
arising from marriage is inadvisable for now, even if constitutionally authorized. Fourteenth
Amendment Congressional enforcement authority may be available to limit the otherwise
applicable state parentage presumption laws. For example, this authority may be used, via
procedural law reforms, to better secure the federal constitutional paternity opportunity
interests of unwed biological fathers in children born of sex to mothers then married to others.
But the exercise of such authority now would disrupt current state judicial child custody and
support powers. As well, such authority involving the interests of unwed biological fathers in
children born of sex to unwed mothers is ill‐advised. When the Supreme Court further clarifies
the substantive interests of biological fathers of children born of sex that it first recognized in
Lehr, Congressional enforcement action would then be more appropriate.

157

Supra notes 76-88

158

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §5.

159

Supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, Congress can and should act now to establish norms guiding medical
professionals and others providing assisted human reproduction (AHR) services. While the
federal constitutional limits on parentage contracts in AHR settings remain unclear,160 with
continuing uncertainties on matters like waivers of the abortion rights, federal statutory
standards on AHR medical providers, counsellors and other service providers, and on
information gathering attending AHR services, are now both needed and authorized under the
Commerce Clause.161
VI.

Possible New U.S. Supreme Court Limits on State Lawmaking
A. New Parentage Norms

If Congressional action addressing the current uncertain and differing state parentage
establishment and disestablishment norms is constitutionally foreclosed, unwise or otherwise
unavailable, the U.S. Supreme Court can act to unify further federal childcare norms across the
country by limiting the current broad state lawmaking on federal constitutional childcare
rightsholders.162 Some problems arising from the interstate variations on legal parentage
would dissipate if the court resolved a few major issues.

The state laws on surrogacy pacts (both traditional and gestational) vary widely and continue to evolve as these
agreements increase in numbers. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, “Traditional Surrogacy Contracts, Partial Enforcement,
and the Challenge for Family Law,” 18 Journal of Health Care Law and Policy 85 (2015). See also supra note 132.

160

See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F. 3d 1517, 1520-1 (11th Cir. 1995) (reproductive services are commercial
activities subject to Congressional regulation).

161

On the possible bases for Supreme Court action in AHR, see e.g., Kimberly M. Mutcherson, “Procreative
Pluralism,” 30 Berkeley J. Gender Law and Justice 22 (2015) (suggesting “justice framework” rather than
liberty/autonomy or equality framework, with federal constitutional protections different for those in non-coital
reproduction who do or do not procreate for profit).
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One major issue is whether a male sperm donor in an AHR setting has the same
paternity opportunity interest for parenthood as does a male whose consensual sex prompts
the birth of his biological offspring.163 If there are similar interests, related questions involve
how and when these interests may be asserted;164 how and when these interests might be
waived, including whether valid preconception, or postconception but prebirth, waivers may be
undertaken;165 and, given the Michael H. precedent, whether any paternity opportunity interest
in the male sperm donor can always be foreclosed if there is a resulting birth into an intact
family (be it same or opposite sex)?166 Sperm contribution via sex might be differentiated as
here – unlike AHR settings – future pregnancy, birth and childcare motivate the contribution
less often.

See, e.g., C.O., at 525 (AHR sperm donor afforded “due process safeguards” where he and birth mother agreed
preimplantation “that there would be a relationship between the donor and the child”) and R.C., 775 P. 3d at 35
(declining to decide if statute on lack of paternity in a sperm donor in an AHR setting infringed upon a federal
constitutional childcare interest where the donor had both a preconception intent to parent and postbirth contact with
the child). Compare Adoption of a Minor, 29 N.E. 3d 830, 836 (Mass. 2015) (notice of and consent to adoption by
same sex partner of the birth mother in AHR setting is not required for known sperm donor who only may have a
theoretical basis to attempt to establish parentage in the future”). The nature of such a paternity opportunity interest,
i.e., a fundamental right or a right subject to state override as long as laws are rational, and not arbitrary, is subject to
some debate. See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶58 (2014).

163

See, e.g., In re K.M.H., 169 P. 3d 1025, 1040-1041 (Kansas 2007) (no substantive due process infringement if
sperm donor’s paternity opportunity interest in a child born to an unwed birth mother is made dependent upon a
writing signed by donor and mother).

164

See, e.g., Szfranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E. 3d 1132, ¶139 (Ill. App. 1st 2015) (oral contract between ex-girlfriend
and ex-boyfriend regarding cryopreserved pre-embryos upheld; ex-girlfriend awarded “sole custody and control”).

165

See, e.g., In re Adoption of Minor, 29 N.E. 3d 830 (Mass. 2015) (while recognizing such a donor may sue in
paternity, not commenting upon the likely result of such a suit; but finding that such a donor – even if an uncle,
cousin, or other family member whose sperm was utilized by a married lesbian couple – was not automatically
entitled to notice of a proposed adoption by the birth mother’s spouse).
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Comparably, in AHR settings might ovum donation prompt parentage opportunity
interests for the donor, especially, but perhaps not just,167 where the donor was in a marital or
substantially similar relationship with the birth mother and where there was a preimplantation
agreement on dual parentage?
Another major issue is whether a birth mother has federal constitutional parental
childcare interests if she delivers a child born of assisted reproduction. If an assisted
reproduction birth mother always has such interest, related questions involve how and when
such interests might be waived, including whether preconception,168 or postconception but
prebirth, waivers may be undertaken. Of course, there is the potential for federal constitutional
differences between varying assisted reproduction birth mothers, as between mothers who
utilized or did not utilize their own eggs169 and between mothers who are or are not formally
contracted gestational carriers.170

Compare, e.g., D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 346 (Fla. 2013) (distinguishing AHR cases involving lesbian
couples where the nonbirth mother was or was not an ovum donor, that is, was or was not a “biological” or “natural”
parent).

167

See, e.g, Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P. 3d 542, 555-6 (Kansas 2013) (written coparenting pact between two
female partners, where one later delivers an AHR child to be raised by both, is enforceable if the child’s best
interests are promoted) [hereinafter Frazier].

168

169

See, e.g., J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1293 (D. Utah 2002) (while woman giving birth may be presumed
the legal mother at birth, “evidence of genetic consanguinity” must dissolve that presumption in favor of legal
parentage for ova and sperm donors, a married couple, so as not to unduly burden and frustrate the donors’
“exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights to . . . raise their own children,” with these rights
originating in both the U.S. and Utah constitutions).

Of course, regardless of what the federal constitution permits, state laws often can further control outcomes. See,
e.g., Rosecky v. Schissel, 833 N.W. 2d 634, ¶65 (Wisc. 2013) (surrogacy contract’s provisions on voluntary
termination of surrogate’s parental rights cannot be enforced as contrary to statutory processes for parental rights
terminations).
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Yet another major issue is whether a current single legal parent may have his/her
federal constitutional childcare interests diminished, though not terminated, through the
recognition of a new legal parent with comparable federal childcare rights arising from his/her
postbirth parental‐like acts, even though there are no biological or formal adoptive ties. If such
new “de facto” parenthood is possible over a single parent’s current objection, as now exists in
some states,171 related questions involve what minimal federal constitutional standards must
operate, including what should be the standards on written waivers and on other single parent
and de facto parent consensual conduct (as with affirmative agreement or passive
acquiescence). Some current state de facto parent standards seemingly are vulnerable to
federal constitutional attack172 as they are quite indefinite and lack explicit requirements on
express single parent consent to, or even passive acquiescence in, new “de facto” parenthood
in another.173

See, e.g., R.M. v T.A., 233 Cal. App. 4th 760, 778 (Cal. App. 4th 2015) (rejecting birth mother’s federal
constitutional challenge to nonsperm donor’s statutory presumed parentage in AHR setting since the court must be
“satisfied the parent permitted the person to engage with the child at a level that transforms the interaction into a
full, openly acknowledged two parent relationship”).

171

See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, “Constitutional Constraints on Second Parent Laws,” 40 Ohio Northern Univ. L.
Rev. 811, 837-842 (2014) [hereinafter Constitutional Constraints].

172

Passive acquiescence of a single parent to de facto parentage in another often arises from a romantic partner’s
residence with that parent and the child, combined with the partner providing financial resources benefitting the
child, who is held out by the partner as the partner’s child. See, e.g., Alabama Code 26-17-204 (a)(5) (“presumed”
parent); California Family Code 7611 (d) (“presumed” parent); and Minnesota Stat. 257.55. The superior parental
rights of the single parent are less likely an obstacle if acquiescence to the establishment of the requirements were
expressly stated to constitute implied consent to possible later second parentage per the de facto parent doctrine. See,
e.g., Constitutional Constraints, at 840. Also consider Missorui v. McNeeley, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013) (plurality
opinion) (recognizing “all 50 states have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of
operating a motor vehicle within the state, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on
suspicion of a drunk-driving offense,” with “significant consequences” when consent is withdrawn), though
withdrawal of consent to possible de facto parentage should be free of adverse consequences).

173
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A related issue is whether two current parents may have their federal constitutional
childcare interests diminished, though not terminated, through the recognition of a third legal
parent arising from his/her postbirth parental‐like acts, even though there are no biological or
formal adoptive ties for the third parent.174 If a third legal parent is possible over current dual
or single parent objections (as due to earlier consent or acquiescence), related questions
involve what, if any, minimal federal constitutional standards must operate. For example, if
one of two current parents with interests cannot veto any proposed third parent who has the
support of the other current federal constitutional childcare parent, are the third parent’s
childcare interests tethered to (e.g., derivative of) the supporting parent’s childcare interests?
Does the third parent lose childcare interests when the supporting parent withdraws support,
loses childcare interests, or dies? And, must any possible third parent be a family member, like
a grandparent or stepparent?
Another federal constitutional issue is whether there may be, automatically or
otherwise, a third parent with federal constitutional childcare interests because of his/her
prebirth rather than postbirth acts. Prebirth acts might include preconception donations of
genetic material in assisted reproduction settings. Prebirth acts might also include three way
voluntary acknowledgements, pledges or provisions of financial support for the pregnancy or
for the future child, and/or pledges of future childcare, arising from premarital or midmarriage
agreements.175

See, e.g., Bancroft, 19 A. 3d at 731 (both federal and state constitutions bar legal recognition of a third childcare
parent with no biological or adoptive ties, as it would infringe on the childcare interests of the two existing parents).

174

175

See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, “Parentage Prenups and Midnups,” 31 Georgia State Law Review 343(2015).
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Yet another issue is whether a prospective birth mother, who will be deemed a mother
under law when she gives birth, can waive her right to abort.176 If so, further issues involve
whether there can be effective waivers before as well as after conception; whether any waivers
operate comparably when conception resulted from sex or assisted reproduction; whether
effective waivers can operate in assisted reproduction settings both when her own or another’s
eggs were used; and, whether effective waivers depend on the prospective mother’s marital
status, and, if so, whether marital status is relevant at the time of the waiver, conception, or
pregnancy. If some waivers of the right to abort are effective, there would be enforcement
issues. Can judicial orders forbid abortions due to earlier waivers? Who may to seek such
waivers? And, who has standing to enforce (where husbands and intended parents in surrogacy
settings may not be similarly treated)?
When litigants seek guidance on these issues, the U.S. Supreme Court should hear their
cases.
B.

Other New Supreme Court Limits on State Lawmaking Discretion

In addition to further unifying federal constitutional parental childcare in the United
States via new parental childcare precedents, the U.S. Supreme Court also could further unify
childcare interests via new federal constitutional precedents operating outside of parentage.
For example, varying types of nonparents (often called third parties) are now childcare

It was reported that Tagg Romney (son of Mitt) and his wife Jen engaged a surrogate who delivered for them
twin sons pursuant to an agreement that if the fetus (contract referenced a “child”) was determined “to be
physiologically, genetically or chromosomally abnormal,” the abortion decision was “to be made by the intended
parents.” See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen,” The Constitution and the Rights Not To Procreate,” 60 Stanford Law Review
1135, 1191-1195 (2008) (a number of reasons why states may be wary about enforcing abortion contracts).
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rightsholders under state law. Nonparents are afforded childcare interests under state laws
that differ from parental childcare interests. Might there be federal constitutional nonparental
childcare interests for grandparents, stepparents or others?177 Federal constitutional issues on
such nonparental childcare include whether blood ties are needed, or are especially important
so that, for example, grandparents must be distinguished from stepparents; whether parental
consent is necessary, and if so, whether passive acquiescence suffices; and, what is the nature
of nonparental conduct required to prompt such interests. As with parental childcare,
nonparental childcare laws benefiting grandparents, stepparents, and others178 now vary
significantly interstate.179

In M.C. v. Adoption Choices of Colorado, Inc., 2014 COA 161, ¶33 (Col. App. 2014), the court found a
prospective adoptive couple had no “protected liberty interest in their relationship with the child they hope to
adopt,” where an earlier adoption decree was voided [hereinafter M.C.], reversed on other grounds, In Interest of
Baby A., 363 P. 3d 193 (Col. 2015).

177

Some nonparental childcare laws now expressly include siblings and greatgrandparents. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 607
(a-3). Nonparental childcaretakers could also include adult siblings; to date the courts have not spoken of their
federal constitutional childcare interests. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, “Siblings in Law,” 65 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 897,
930 (2012) (“Lastly, states should consider whether full of half-siblings separated by divorce, the end of a
nonmarital relationship, or a parent’s death will have an enforceable right to contact, communication and visitation
unless a court determines that such connection would be contrary to the best interests of one or more siblings.”)
[hereinafter Hasday].
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See, e.g., Jeff Atkinson, “Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek Visitation or Custody of
Children,” 47 Family Law Quarterly 1(2013).
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The U.S. Supreme Court might also consider the federal constitutional interests of
children in certain adult childcare,180 or in maintaining certain sibling relationships.181 Here, the
rightsholders would be children who have interests in receiving love, affection, and childcare.
Relatedly, per new precedents, children may be deemed federal constitutional
rightsholders as to information regarding their biological roots, thereby allowing for more
intelligent decisions about health care, procreation and the like. Thus, for example, when
children born of sex are formally adopted, or about to be adopted by foster parents or others
where the biological fathers are unknown, state officers could be obligated to secure and
maintain information on those with biological ties for later use by the children, at least for
certain purposes like medical decisionmaking.182 For now, generally there are no such state

See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130 (the U.S. Supreme Court has not “had occasion to declare whether a child
has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her relationship”). Frazier, at 557 (deeming
that denial to children with two parents opportunities to continue their childcare by a nonparent under law “impinges
upon the children’s constitutional rights”); M.C., at ¶53 (child has no liberty interest in continuing relationship with
prospective adoptive couple); and In Re Adoption of I.B., 19 N.E. 3d 784, 791 (Ind. App. 2014) (children have
“liberty interest in preserving the integrity and stability of their existing familial relationship” with maternal
grandmother who was statutorily ineligible to adopt, but where statute was unconstitutional as applied).
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See, e.g., In re Adoption of I.B., 19 N.E. 3d 784, 791 (Ind. App. 2014) (siblings have “a liberty interest in
preserving the integrity and stability of their existing familial relationship and are entitled to be free from arbitrary
state action affecting that relationship”). But see In re Meridian H., 798 N.W. 2d 96, 99 (Neb. 2011) (no federal or
state constitutional right, to date, involving continuing sibling relationships, as where one sibling is placed in foster
care and two siblings are adopted) and In re Luke, 221 Cal. App. 4th 1082 (Cal. App. 3d 2013) (no constitutional
protection of sibling relationships over custodial parent’s objection). Often constitutional interests are not even
raised. See, e.g., B.L.M. v. A.M., 381 S.W. 3d 319, 321 (Ky. App. 2012). General support of a child’s interest in a
continuing sibling or sibling-like relationship is found in James G. Dwyer, The Relationship Rights of Children
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) and Hasday, supra note 178.
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See, e.g., Ronald K. Henry, “The Innocent Third Party: Victims of Paternity Fraud,” 40 Family Law Quarterly
51, 68 (2006) (“The child’s best and only interest in paternity establishment lies in finding that child’s biological
father. That child needs to know his or her genetic heritage for medical purposes.”).
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laws. There are few duties on governmental officials to identify unknown (usually male)
biological parents whose children are placed for formal adoption.183
VII. Conclusion
U.S. Supreme Court precedents recognize federal constitutional childcare rights in
parents that may not be easily diminished or eliminated under law. Yet these childcare
rightsholders are mainly defined by state laws, which vary widely on parentage and which can
be dependent upon biological ties, functional parenthood, or contracts. Deference to state
lawmaking here is unique as no other federal constitutional rights depend on state law
definitions of rightsholders. This deference has led to many problems which cannot be, or
should not be, addressed by Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court should soon answer several
important questions about federal childcare parents. This would reduce current problems and
recognize federal constitutional childcare rightsholders under national norms as exist for all
other federal constitutional rightsholders.

See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, “Abortions of the Parental Prerogatives of Unwed Natural Fathers: Deterring Lost
Paternity,” 53 Oklahoma L. Rev. 345 (2000) (reviewing federal substantive and procedural due process protections
of unwed biological fathers in their children and suggesting how expanded procedural protections can deter the
unwarranted abortions of male parental rights in adoptions proceedings.
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